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STERNLOFF v. HUGHES: VAGUENESS AS
AFFECTING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN DEED DESCRIPTIONS
The purpose of this note is to briefly examine the case law in New
Mexico regarding the admissibility of extrinsic evidence when a
description in a deed is challenged as void for vagueness. The discus-
sion will attempt to discern some standard as to when a vague de-
scription in a deed may be clarified by extrinsic evidence. The basis
for this discussion is the case of Sternloff v. Hughes,1 a case which
involved a quiet title action wherein plaintiff's deed was challenged
as void for vagueness. The issue in Sternloff and the focus of this
discussion is the determination of when a property description in a
deed is so vague as to fail to supply a basis for the admission of
extrinsic evidence.
BACKGROUND
Early authority held that extrinsic evidence was inadmissible in
the case of a patent ambiguity and admissible in the case of a latent
ambiguity in the description of property in a deed.' The distinction
between patent and latent ambiguity 3 is gradually disappearing and
1. 91 N.M. 604, 577 P.2d 1250 (1978).
2. Detroit, Y.H. & M.R. Co. v. Howland, 246 Mich. 318, 224 N.W. 366 (1929).
3. Latent and Patent ambiguity have been defined as follows:
There be two sorts of ambiguities of words; the one is "ambiguitas patens"
and the other is "ambiguitas latens." "Patens" is that which appears to be
ambiguous upon the deed or instrument; "latens" is that which seemeth cer-
taih and without ambiguity for anything that appeareth upon the deed or
instrument, but there is some collateral matter out of the deed that breedeth
the ambiguity. "Ambiguitas patens" is never holpen by averment, and the
reason is, because the law will not couple and mingle matter of specialty,
which is of the higher account, with matter of averment, which is of inferior
account in law; for that were to make all deeds hollow and subject to aver-
ments, and so, in effect, that to pass without deed, which the law appointeth
shall not pass but by deed. Therefore if a man give land to "I. D. et I. S.
hoeredibus," and do not limit to whether of their heirs, it shall not be supplied
by averment to whether of them the intention was the inheritance should be
limited.... But if it be "ambiguitas latens," then otherwise it is. As I grant my
manor of S. to 1. F. and his heirs, here appeareth no ambiguity at all upon the
deed; but if the truth be that I have the manors both of South S. and North S.,
this ambiguity is matter in fact; and therefore it shall be holpen by averment,
whether of them it was that the parties intended should pass.... Another sort
of "ambiguitas latens" is correlative unto this: for this ambiguity spoken of
before is, when one name and appellation doth denominate divers things; and
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the modem tendency is to allow a liberal interpretation of the
description to arrive at the intention of the parties.4 Some courts
have gone so far as to state that extrinsic evidence is admissible to
explain all ambiguities in a deed, whether latent or patent.' The
authority examined in Sternloff' seems to take a middle approach.
The goal of the court under this approach is to determine whether
the "intention of the parties can be ascertained and effectuated" '
from an examination of the extrinsic evidence available.
The New Mexico Supreme Court held in Armijo v. New Mexico
Town Co. 8 that parol evidence is admissible if it does not tend to
vary, modify or contradict the deed but is used simply to apply the
deed to its subject matter and to identify the lands intended to be
conveyed.9 Armijo involved an action for breach of covenants in
deeds of conveyance and resort to parol was necessary to connect the
deed with the premises being identified. In State ex rel Highway
Dept. v. Davis,1 a factually different case yet still involving the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence in interpreting a deed, the New
Mexico Supreme Court held that if extrinsic evidence is used to
identify the land to be conveyed, the deed itself must point to the
source from which the evidence is to be sought.' I The case involved
a deed from the Atrisco land grant to the grantee's predecessor in
interest. There were uncertainties in the description contained in the
original deed and the court allowed the testimony of the secretary of
the board of trustees of the land grant to establish which land was
intended to be conveyed, because the deed made reference to lands
the second is, when the same thing is called by divers names. As, if I give lands
to Christ Church in Oxford, and the name of the corporation is "Ecclesia
Christi in Universitate Oxford," this shall be holpen by averment, because
there appears no ambiguity in the words: for the variance is matter in fact. But
the averment shall not be of the intention, because it does not stand with the
words. For in the case of equivocation of the general intent includes both the
special, and therefore stands with the words: but so it is not in variance; and
therefore the averment must be a matter that doth induce a certainty, and not
of intention; as to say that the precinct of "Oxford" and of "the University of
Oxford" is one and the same, and not to say that the intention of the parties
was that the grant should be to Christ Church in the University of Oxford.
Circa, 1597, Sir Francis Bacon, Maxims, rule XXV (Works, Spedding's ed., 1861, vol. XIV,
p. 273) (as quoted in 9 Wigmore § 2472).
4. Detroit, Y.H. & M.R. Co. v. Howland, 246 Mich. 318, 224 N.W. 366 (1929).
5. Shore v. Miller, 80 Ga. 93, 4 S.E. 561 (1887).
6. 91 N.M. 604, 577 P.2d 1250 (1978).
7. Marquez v. Padilla, 77 N.M. 620, 626, 426 P.2d 593, 597 (1967).
8. 3 N.M. 427, 5 P. 709 (1855).
9. Id. at 435, 5 P. at 712.
10. 85 N.M. 759, 517 P.2d 743 (1973).
11. Id. at 763, 517 P.2d at 747, quoting from Komadina v. Edmondson, 81 N.M. 467,
469, 468 P.2d 632, 634 (1970).
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belonging to the land grant.1 2 It also appeared that the board mem-
ber who testified had staked the corners of the property along with
the predecessor in interest and had also assisted the surveyor by
pointing out such corners. 3 While it is not clear from the opinion, it
appears that the only reason the board member was allowed to tes-
tify is because the deed made reference to lands of the Atrisco land
grant.' 4
Having established that a deed must point to the source from
which the evidence is to be sought, it has been further stated by the
New Mexico Supreme Court that the deed will not be deemed void
"because the instrument referred to is incomplete, not official, un-
acknowledged, unrecorded, unattached or misdescribed in some par-
ticular."' 5 This decision arose out of a quiet title suit wherein the
plaintiff's deed from which title was asserted made reference in its
description to a survey map which had never been certified nor re-
corded with the county clerk.' 6 A factor apparently contributing to
the admissibility of the map was that the map was commonly used
by assessors, abstractors and others in Santa Fe County.
Problems have arisen concerning deeds whose description of the
land intended to be conveyed are difficult if not impossible to apply,
absent the introduction of extrinsic evidence. In Garcia v. Garcia,1 7
wherein the court allowed the use of evidence gained by subsequent
acts of the parties, the court held that the intention of the grantor
must be derived from the language of the instrument, and this inten-
tion cannot be impeached except upon equitable grounds to prevent
injustice by reason of accident, mistake or fraud.' 8 In the Garcia
case the parties went upon the land and generally pointed out the
boundaries to the surveyor. This activity was significant because
otherwise the deed by which the plaintiffs claimed title would have
failed for lack of means by which to identify the lands. The Garcia
case must be read in light of Weeks v. Padilla,' 9 wherein the court
held that where extrinsic evidence is allowed to aid the description in
a deed, if the description in the deed is inconsistent to a large degree
with that established by extrinsic evidence, then the deed will not
12. 85 N.M. 759, 763, 517 P.2d 743, 747 (1973).
13. Id. at 760, 517 P.2d at 744.
14. Id. at 763, 517 P.2d at 747.
15. Hughes v. Meem, 70 N.M. 122, 125, 371 P.2d 235, 238 (1962) quoting 26 C.J.S.
Deeds §30(0 at 652-55 (1956).
16. 70 N.M. at 126, 371 P.2d at 238.
17. 86 N.M. 503, 525 P.2d 863 (1974).
18. Id. at 505, 525 P.2d at 865.
19. 35 N.M. 180, 291 P. 922 (1930).
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serve to pass title.2" This is perhaps the only constraint on the
extent to which extrinsic evidence will be permitted.
One other case precedent to Sternloff which merits mention is the
case of Richardson v. Duggar,2 1 in which the court held that if
stipulated to, extrinsic evidence need not be mentioned in the
deed.2 2 The Richardson case involved a quiet title action in which a
surveyors plat was introduced by stipulation of the parties to clarify
the ambiguities in the deed. The facts of that case are largely anal-
ogous to Sternloff
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Sternloff the admissibility of extrinsic evidence was again quali-
fied. The case involved a quiet title suit brought in Santa Fe County.
Defendants claimed title to the tract in dispute by adverse posses-
sion. They further averred that the 1912 deed by which the plaintiff
claimed title was too vague and indefinite to transfer title and was,
therefore, void. The trial court found for the plaintiff and quieted
title in his favor. The main point at issue was whether the property
description in the 1912 deed was so vague as to prevent the admis-
sion of extrinsic evidence. The trial court held that it was not.
The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed, holding inter alia that
an uncertain description in a deed may be clarified by subsequent
acts of the parties and other extrinsic evidence. The court said:
In the instant case, with the exception of a U.S. Department of
Interior Geological Survey Map, the extrinsic evidence relied upon
by the Plaintiff related to information in the deed, acts of his prede-
cessor in title and his own actions. The U.S. Geological Survey Map
was introduced by stipulation. Use of the map is proper, as well as
evidence of the acts of the parties and predecessor in title.2 3
The court in Sternloff established that a deed should refer to extrin-
sic information from which the land might be located. In the absence
of such reference, however, subsequent acts of the parties such as the
going upon the land and generally pointing out the boundaries to the
surveyor or the stipulation to the introduction of a U.S. Geological
Survey Map, or other survey map or plat will be admissible to clarify
the description in the deed.2"
20. Id at 184, 291 P. at 923-24.
21. 86 N.M. 494, 525 P.2d 854 (1974).
22. Id. at 497, 525 P.2d at 857.
23. 91 N.M. 604, 607, 577 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1978) (citations omitted).
24. Id.
[Vol. 9
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DISCUSSION
On appeal the court had to decide three issues: whether the prop-
erty description in the 1912 deed was too vague to permit the admis-
sion of extrinsic evidence; whether the surveyor and court, aided by
such extrinsic evidence, found certain facts lacking in evidentiary
support; and whether the plaintiff was guilty of laches.
In addressing the issue of whether the property description was
too vague to permit the admission of extrinsic evidence, the court
relied on the general rule set out in Garcia v. Garcia.2 s In that case
the court held that an indefinite description in a deed may be clari-
fied by subsequent acts of the parties and other extrinsic evidence.2 6
As in Garcia, the facts of Sternloff involved a survey introduced
through the aid of extrinsic evidence. In Garcia the parties to the
lawsuit aided the surveyor by pointing out the boundaries of the
property. In Sternloff, an adjoining landowner at the request of the
plaintiff, aided the surveyor by pointing out the boundaries. In both
cases the survey was introduced as extrinsic evidence. The extent to
which such evidence may be used appears to be limitless.2 7
The court cited six other New Mexico cases where property de-
scriptions naming adjoining property owners or physical land
characteristics have been sustained through the aid of extrinsic evi-
dence.2 8 In Romero v. Garcia2 9 the court held that a deed is not
void for want of a proper description, if, with the aid of the deed and
the extrinsic evidence, a surveyor on the ground can ascertain the
boundaries.3 0 In Romero the court stated that the subsequent acts
of the plaintiff in erecting a house and pointing to the land were
sufficient to ascertain the boundaries.' 1 In Marquez v. Padilla,3 2 the
portion of the opinion dealing with the sufficiency of the deed is
largely dicta. Despite this fact, the court in Marquez quoted at length
from First Savings Bank and Trust Co., Albuquerque v. Elgin,3 3
stating that the test in every case is whether or not the intention of
the grantor and grantee can be discovered and effectuated. 4 Unless
the rights of third parties intervene, a deed will be valid.3  If a deed
25. 86 N.M. 503, 525 P.2d 863 (1974).
26. Id. at 505, 525 P.2d at 865.
27. 91 N.M. 604, 607, 577 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1978).
28. Id. at 606, 577 P.2d at 1252.
29. 89 N.M. 1, 546 P.2d 66 (1976).
30. Id. at 3,546 P.2d at 68 quoting 16 Am. Jur. Deeds §262 (1938).
31. 89 N.M. at 4, 546 P.2d at 69.
32. 77 N.M. 620, 426 P.2d 593 (1967).
33. 29 N.M. 595, 225 P. 582 (1924).
34. 77 N.M. 593, 625-26, 426 P.2d 593, 597 (1967).
35. Id. at 625-26, 426 P.2d at 597.
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contains an uncertain or indefinite description, the parties may by
agreement go upon the land intended to be conveyed and mark out
the boundaries, either before or after the execution of the deed. This
action gives effect to the deed.3 6
The court in Garcia v. Pihieda3 ' stated that if a description in a
conveyance affords sufficient means of identifying the land, then
parol evidence will be admissible to specifically identify the prop-
erty. It is not apparent what made the description in that case suffi-
ciently definite to permit the admission of extrinsic evidence. The
deed description in Garcia read as follows:
A small sod house composed of two small rooms and a small hall-
way, which have erected upon the locality which corresponds with
property of Antonio Silva, and which house I have sold together
with the little courtyard [chorreras] as specified in this present doc-
ument. First, on the south side a courtyard of ten varas; on the east
seven and a half varas; on the north three varas; on the west to the
line which is the old public wagon road.38
There is no reference to any source from which extrinsic evidence
might be derived. The court seemingly ignored the fact that there
might be more than one Antonio Silva or that Mr. Silva may own
property in more than one locality and permitted extrinsic evidence
to identify the land.
The holding in Garcia might be applied to Sternloff by comparing
the descriptions in each case. The deed description in Sternloff read
as follows:
The following tract of land situated and being in Precinct No. 3 in
the County of Santa Fe and State of New Mexico, to-wit:
Twenty four acres of land from a portion of landed deeded to the
said party of the first part by a certain United States Patent issued to
the said par_y of the first part for the N.W.Q. of S. 9 in T. 16 N.R.
10 E.N.M.M. in New Mexico, containing one hundred and sixty
acres. The twenty four acres deeded to the said party of the second
part by the said party of the first part as bounded and described as
follows, to-wit: On the east by an arroyo of El Carnerito, on the
south by lands of Antonio Ortiz y Rodajas, on the west by govern-
ment lands, and on the north by lands of the party of the first part.
With free entrances and exits which shall not be disturbed. (Under-
lined portion contained in original deed.) 3 9
By comparison to Garcia, the Sternloff description would more than
36. Id.
37. 33 N.M. 651, 275 P. 370 (1929).
38. Id. at 652, 275 P. at 370.
39. 91 N.M. 604, 605, 577 P.2d 1250, 1251 (1978).
[Vol. 9
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suffice for the admission of extrinsic evidence because the descrip-
tion specifically identifies the locality, the amount of acreage to be
conveyed and a metes and bounds description of the section from
which the property is being deeded.4 0
The court in State v. Board of Trustees of Town of Las Vegas"'
upheld a deed description as nebulous as the description in Garcia
The description in Board of Trustees read as follows:
Description: Bounded on the north, Sapello River; south, Antonio
Ortiz grant; east, Aquaji Llyegua; west, Pecos forest. The remaining
part being hilly and rough cannot be used for agriculture; dry grazing
lands. * * * 35,000 acres, at $4.50, class E land, $157,500.00.42
The case involved an action by the state against the Board of Trustees
of the Las Vegas grant for taxes assessed upon the foregoing real
estate. In upholding the description, the court stated that a descrip-
tion will be good if it would be sufficient in a deed to identify the
property so that title would pass, as opposed to the previous stan-
dard of being sufficient in and of itself to identify the property.
4 I
The court failed to articulate what type of description would be
sufficient to pass title other than a fleeting allusion to Armijo v. New
Mexico Town Co.4 4 However, the court issued a disclaimer of sorts
by quoting Mr. Justice Parker in Manby v. Voorhees:
4 s
In so holding, we desire to be rather cautious in laying down any
hard and fast rule on the subject of necessary description of prop-
erty for taxation. We appreciate the difficulty in this state in prop-
erly describing real estate, because of the fact that a large proportion
of the property is held by metes and bounds rather than by govern-
ment legal subdivisions, growing out of the fact of the large areas
covered by Spanish and Mexican land grants.
4 6
This is perhaps the only occasion in which the court articulated the
reality that the adequacy of deed descriptions admit of no hard and
fast rules. Such a statement is, in effect, an admission that adequacy
of descriptions in a deed is largely, if not entirely, a factual matter.
The case of Armijo v. New Mexico Town Co.' I involved an action
for breach of covenants which were a component part of the deeds
of conveyance. In Armijo the court upheld the general rule that if
40. Id. at 607, 577 P.2d at 1253; Richardson v. Duggar, 86 N.M. 494, 525 P.2d 854
(1974); Garcia v. Garcia, 86 N.M. 503, 525 P.2d 863 (1974).
41. 32 N.M. 182, 253 P. 22 (1927).
42. Id. at 186, 253 P. at 23.
43. Id. at 187, 253 P. at 23.
44. 3 N.M. 427, 5 P. 709 (1885).
45. 27 N.M. 511, 203 P. 543 (1921).
46. 32 N.M. 182, 187, 253 P. 22, 23 (1927).
47. 3 N.M. 427, 5 P. 709 (1885).
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the description of the premises given in a deed affords sufficient
means of ascertaining and identifying the land intended to be con-
veyed, it is sufficient to sustain the conveyance. 4" The court also
stated that it is not essential that the conveyance itself contain such a
description that would enable identification to be made without the
aid of extrinsic evidence.4 I While the Armilo rule may be criticized
as overbroad and contradictory to the entire notion of clarity and
specificity of description, it is, nonetheless, one of the earliest edicts
of the New Mexico Supreme Court in regard to adequacy of descrip-
tion. If anything, Armijo should be viewed as a starting point for
interpretation of all subsequent opinions. The court in Armijo im-
posed one limiting constraint on the admissibility of parol evidence.
The court said that parol evidence is only admissible if it does not
tend to vary, modify, or contradict the deed but is used simply to
apply the deed to its subject matter and to identify the lands in-
tended to be conveyed.' 0
While these cases hardly admit of any uniform or yardstick mea-
sure, they do give a basis for the consideration of the court in deter-
mining what is a sufficient description. The question of adequacy of
deed descriptions can also be addressed by examining what the court
deems to be an insufficient description. In Komadina v. Edmond-
son,5 ' the court held that the following description failed to refer to
extrinsic evidence from which the land could be located:
A certain tract of land situated in School district No. 28, Bernalillo
County, New Mexico, Bounded on the North by a Road and on the
East by land of Doloritas Chavez and on the South by a Road and
on the West by the Atrisco Land Grant. Being one of several tracts
of land allotted from the Atrisco Land Grant and more particularly
described as follows:
Measure on the North 210 feet;
Measure on the East 1037 feet;
Measure on the South 210 feet;
Measure on the West 1037 feet.
Contains five acres of land more or less. Tract No. 331. 52
The extrinsic evidence offered concerned the unnamed roads in the
description and a piece of wrapping paper given the surveyor by a
member of the Board of the Town of Atrisco. No roads were in
existence at the time of the execution of the deed and the area had
48. Id. at 435, 5 P. at 712.
49. Id. at 435, 5 P. at 712, quoting from Stanley v. Green, 12 Cal. 148, 166 (1859).
50. Id. at 436, 5 P. at 712.
51. 81 N.M. 467, 468 P.2d 632 (1970).
52. Id. at 468, 468 P.2d at 633.
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not been platted except by a drawing on the wrapping paper.' I The
court in Sternloff distinguished Komadina on the grounds that in
Sternloff the U.S. Geological Map was introduced by stipulation,
whereas in Komadina there was no basis for the introduction of the
drawing on a piece of wrapping paper, nor was there any basis for the
introduction of evidence in regard to the unnamed roads.
SUMMARY
The conclusions to be drawn from Sternloff and the cases that
preceeded it are that the deed must refer to extrinsic information
from which the land might be located."s In the absence of such
reference, extrinsic material may also be introduced by stipulation of
the parties.' ' In addition, whenever land is described by a particular
name or designation, it is uniformly held that parol evidence is ad-
missible to show what land is being designated and thus identifying
the tract intended to be conveyed.' 6 Prior to Sternloff, the appli-
cable rule was that:
it is not necessary that the description of the land be contained in
the body of the deed. It is sufficient if it refers for identification to
some other instrument or document, but the description must be
contained in the instrument or its reference, express or implied, with
such certainty that the locality of the land can be ascertained, * * *
the rule has also been held to apply to maps and plats, including
surveys, and to an assessor's plan. The deed is not void because the
instrument referred to is incomplete, not official, or unattached, or
is misdescribed in some particular, or even invalid.5 7
Sternloff modified the general rule by stating that in the case of a
vague description in a deed, if extrinsic evidence is to be allowed,
specific reference must be made to such evidence.' ' Unexpressed or
implied reference is not sufficient. Furthermore, in the absence of
such references, extrinsic evidence may only be introduced by stipula-
tion.5 9
While this may appear to be a liberal, overly flexible rule, the
53. Id at 469, 468 P.2d at 634.
54. State ex rel State Highway Dept. v. Davis, 85 N.M. 759, 763, 517 P.2d 743, 747
(1973).
55. Richardson v. Duggar, 86 N.M. 494, 525 P.2d 854 (1974).
56. Adams v. Cox, 52 N.M. 56, 61, 191 P.2d 352, 356 (1948); Hetherington v. Clark, 30
Pa. 393 (1858); Hinton v. Moore, 139 N.C. 44, 51 S.E. 787 (1905).
57. Hughes v. Meem, 70 N.M. 122, 125, 371 P.2d 235, 237-38 (1962) quoting 26 C.J.S.
Deeds §30(f) 652-55 (1956). The description in Hughes, read as follows: "Tract 87, Zim-
merman's Map, 1904."
58. 91 N.M. 604, 607, 577 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1978).
59. Richardson v. Duggar, 86 N.M. 494, 525 P.2d 854 (1974).
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history of the state mandates such a policy. In the past, professional
surveyors were uncommon. Deed descriptions of property made by
reference to adjoining property, neighbors, land grants and roads
were extremely prevalent, if not the rule. 6 0 Out of necessity, the
courts of this state developed liberal standards. Present surveying
techniques, however, afford sufficient basis for adequate, clear deed
descriptions. Thus, it would appear reasonable for the courts to
apply a stricter standard to deed descriptions executed in more re-
cent times in order to avoid encouraging ambiguous deed descrip-
tions.
DAVID N. HERNANDEZ
60. Manby v. Voorhees, 27 N.M. 511, 524, 203 P. 543, 548 (1921).
(Vol. 9
